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Abstract
Taking a psychological and philosophical outlook, we approach making as an
embodied and embedded skill via the skilled artisan’s experience of having a
corporeal, nonlinguistic dialogue with the material while working with it. We
investigate the dynamic relation between maker and material through the lens of
pottery as illustrated by wheel throwing, claiming that the experience of
dialogue signals an emotional involvement with clay. The examination of
Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of habit, the skilled intentionality framework,
and material engagement theory shows that while these theories explain com-
plementary aspects of skillful engagement with the material world, they do not
consider the dialogic dimension. By way of explanation, we submit that the
artisan’s emotional engagement with the material world is based in openness
and recognition and involves dialogue with the material. Drawing on the
intimate relationship between movement and emotion, it promotes an open-
ended manner of working and permits experiencing with the material, acting
into its inherent possibilities. In conclusion, we suggest that dialogue, whether
verbal or nonverbal, constitutes a primary means for making sense of the world
at large, animate and inanimate.
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1 The art of making
Making refers to the multi-scalar and dynamic process of producing something skill-
fully by hand relying on custom and long-established methods. Typically, mastering a
craft requires manual dexterity, i.e., the ability to use your hands in a coordinated way
to grasp and manipulate objects with small and precise movements, and prolonged
training and experience. It involves proprioceptive and kinaesthetic knowledge relative
to oneself and the material, that is, knowledge of the kind that one understands with
one’s body as opposed to by or through it (Sheets-Johnstone 2012).
Relating to body posture, postural control, position and orientation, motion, timing,
and rhythm, bodily skill emerges from sensorimotor dependencies and may involve
conscious experiences and feelings (Brinck 1999). Thus, Gordon (2003) clarifies the
advantage of hands-on experiment for textile research in giving access to the sensations
and first-person experiences of working with certain materials and techniques.
She describes how reproducing Shaker fabrics using original equipment im-
proved her understanding not only of how experience and feeling continuously
inform the process of making, but also of the various efforts and skills that
textile production demands.
Additionally to bodily skill, making brings into play a variety of general abilities
including affect regulation, imagery, meta-attention, epistemic action, planning, prob-
lem-solving, and imagination. The art of making is a many-sided, multimodal under-
taking that challenges understanding in several ways. Cognitive process and material
procedure in one, it profits equally from technical proficiency and creative pursuit and
being firmly grounded in tradition, shows the signs of a situated practice (Brinck 2007;
Lave 1988). Sense-making and knowledge are relational, conditioned by the social,
cultural, material, and physical environment, and distributed, built into the design of
artefacts, infrastructure, techniques, and roles. Accordingly, the embedding socio-
culture and its associated technologies shape the craftsperson’s experience of connect-
edness with the physical world and locate him or her within a historical tradition.
The view that you can have a dialogue with materials recurs in artisans’ descriptions
of their practices. They refer to a dialogue without language, a dialogue between body
and material. Judging by these descriptions, dialogic relation co-varies with a direct,
qualitatively felt involvement with the material at hand that neither unreflective nor
reasoned relations capture. While the mentions of having such a relation are numerous,
they also are cursory, and accounts that specify what it entails or describe its emergence
are hard to come by.
Turning to the sciences, explanations of skilful action and expert skill in psychology,
philosophy, and related areas do not have much to say about experience and dialogue in
the process of making, but tend to focus on motor behaviour and sub-personal or
implicit processes that are unavailable for voluntary control and inaccessible to con-
scious awareness. Because the makers refer to a wordless and dynamic dialogue, dual-
process theories that add a level of symbolic and rule-based processing to the implicit
processing do not address the heart of the matter.
The experience of having a dialogue with materials seems central to the process of
making and apparently reflects a highly valued aspect of the crafts practices, largely
neglected among researchers. Our aim is to describe the nature of this experience, using
pottery as the prime example.
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2 Through the potter's lens
Pottery involves making things out of clay, a natural material created by weathered
rock. The process is complex. Beginning with the selection of the type of clay and the
size of the lump, it draws on several distinct skills and techniques and may involve
tools and additional materials such as the wheel, knife, kiln, and ceramic glaze.
Moreover, there are numerous methods and procedures for decorating, glazing, and
firing, and several ways of ordering them, which means the process can take very
diverse forms in the hands of different potters.
The choice of pottery rather than any other craft to clarify the dialogic nature of
making is motivated by the physical properties of clay, which encourage approaching it
as a partner in conversation – and allegedly more strongly so than in the case of other
materials in the crafts such as glass, metal, wood, or textile. That certain features of clay
invite thinking of it as a conversational partner is widely recognized in the research on
craft and as a rule not held to require justification. Potters are prone to spontaneously
describe their relation with clay in terms of involvement and dialogue. By way of
example, consider studio potter Bruce Kitts (2016, p. 8) explaining his interest in
ceramics in an interview in Mendocino Arts Magazine:
I choose to work with clay because I find it is the most inviting medium to have a
conversation with . . . Through its extreme malleability, multiple transitions and
physical stages, and unusual ability to retainmemory, clay speaks to us inmanyways.
The properties that make clay conducive to dialogic engagement are readily noticeable
and open to observation.1 Clay is plastic and malleable and responds quickly to touch
and movement, although there are clear limits to its elasticity, which makes it resistant.
It can be worked for a relatively short time and demands high body involvement and
delicacy. In contrast to many other materials that you find within the crafts, the physical
properties of clay differ at the outset of the process, while working, and at the end. The
overall flexibility and pliability of clay together with its distinct inherent limitations
invite active involvement with the material and encourages embarking on systematic
and extended, sometimes decades long, exploration of particular techniques or proce-
dures for working it. In all, working with clay demands considerable attention and
moment-by-moment improvisation – to what degree depends on the potter’s situation,
abilities and ambitions.
Pottery is an embodied, nonlinear process that includes working with its dedicated
materials openly and without intermediaries, and therefore suitable for observational
studies with the observer’s role ranging from non-participatory (observing from outside
the research setting) to fully participatory (taking part in the activities as a member of the
culture). Phenomenological investigations describe how a given phenomenon is expe-
rienced. In addition to practice-led research, personal statements from potters, although
anecdotal, elucidate the practice of throwing by providing a high degree of detail.
1 Summarizing the properties in general terms using everyday language suggests that at least superficially clay
shares some behaviour traits with humans, pertaining to the context of social or interpersonal encounters.
Thus, clay invites a variety of techniques for interacting with it, responds immediately, requires sensitivity and
attention, resists certain ways of approaching it, does not tolerate waiting, and reacts strongly to being
maltreated. Finally, its behaviour is often difficult to predict although it shows regularities.
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The present paper draws on several sources and exposes pottery from distinct but
compatible perspectives to enrich our understanding of it. We consult ethnographic
studies of making in the crafts and pottery in particular, research about engagement and
dialogue in developmental psychology, philosophy and the cognitive sciences, and
practice-led research in the crafts, visual arts and design. Moreover, we rely on potters’
first-hand experiences of making in the form of personal statements and interviews
published on personal websites, the official websites of ceramics associations and
pottery studios, and in craft journals and magazines of the trade. The latter sources
give insight into the artisans’ own conceptions and reflections about making and its
phenomenal or qualitatively felt aspects, and function to complement the perspectives
from sensorimotor cognition and pre-reflective phenomenological consciousness that
are prevalent in much contemporary research on skill and practices in the crafts and
arts. Finally, one of us has been making wheel-thrown pots for a few years, and her
diary notes reflecting her personal experiences have continuously informed the
investigation.
On the assumption that the potters’ personal statements provide a window into the
qualitative experience of working with clay, we will take them at face value. This does
not mean that we take them to constitute true descriptions of the maker’s relation to
clay, as opposed to being true of the maker’s experience of this relation. We think these
statements expose an underlying, unarticulated yet attentive approach to making that is
unavailable from an observational perspective. Specifically, we believe that the potters’
testimonies provide evidence of a manner of engaging with materials characteristic of
the proficient artisan, which exploits the second-person perspective inherent to emo-
tional engagement and involves listening to the material ready-to-hand as from a You.
Importantly, although experience is multimodal and multitemporal, the present shaped
by memories of the past and expectations about the future on several time scales
(Hutchins 2010, p. 432), the master potters’ experiences of throwing cohere.
We will look next into the potter’s experiences with clay. We then go on to compare
two accounts of skilful action with respect to how they can explain the potter’s
involvement with the clay while working it: Merleau-Ponty’s (1945) theory of habit
including an extension of it into ecological psychology, and Malafouris’ (2008, 2013)
theory of material engagement.
3 Experiencing with clay
In an interview in the internet journal 3 Dots Water (2010), Swiss-based ceramist and
artist Charlotte Nordin asserts that many beginners approach ceramics as an object:
When you have your first mass of clay in your hands and you put it on the
throwing wheel with your bare hands and you make a shape out of it, it is quite
emotional. Your reaction might be ‘Oh! I just made a bowl!’
Nordin’s remark suggests that the novice does not see the bowl in relation, but as a
thing. The emotion there is pride, something achieved in terms of a societal marker.
This situation stands in contrast to involved making, where the emerging pot is within
dialogue, often evoking wonder at times, but wonder that sees the pot as the emergent
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Other – like the wonder that sometimes arises in engaging with babies, an awe at who
they are but in being present to them. In line with this, Nordin goes on to explain that as
experience grows you will realize that the bowl is there because of the dialogue
between the clay and your hands, and that the bowl does not really belong to you
and is not a mere thing. Nordin adds that the clay has its own expression, which
depends on how the clay is responding.
Similar to the relation between child and parent, the relation between potter and clay
continues to develop over time. Eventually it permits dialogue. There is not any point in
time at which the potter will be fully experienced or will know everything there is to
know about clay. On the contrary, because the circumstances never repeat, pottery
offers endless opportunities to improve one’s skills simply by doing it. In the case of
craftsmanship, exercising a skill and learning to exercise it are concomitant, which
means that improvement of the skill is continuous with its practice (Ryle 1949, p. 58).
Learning and doing defy separation. Deliberately training a skill, e.g., by exposing
oneself for more difficult, perhaps unfamiliar conditions will develop the skill beyond
the present limits of the agent and sometimes results in qualitative change to the agent’s
abilities and skills.
Working with clay tends to raise strong and specific feelings in the agent, reflected in
potters’ widely attested experience of interconnectedness with organic matter. Making
brings together psychological and material processes not solely from the cognitive
point of view but phenomenologically too. The potter’s experiences with clay can be
roughly divided into three types.
First, both novice and experienced potters state that working with clay engenders a
direct and strong experience of familiarity and relatedness with the material. Working
it appears natural and effortless and is fulfilling and strikingly pleasant. According to
Finnish ceramicist and researcher Priska Falin (2014, p. 7),
[T]he specific reasons why the material engages us in the first place are hard to
identify. I feel that I have a strong sensitivity towards ceramics as a material and
that this sensitivity is an important driver that engages me in my practice.
The choice to engage with a specific material such as clay, metal, or textile and devote
yourself to the corresponding craft often is made by the passion; it is an ungainsayable
imperative that originates in the material. George Ohr (known as the mad potter of
Biloxi) famously said: “[W]hen I found the potter’s wheel, I fell all over like a wild
duck in water” (2004). In a similar tone, woodworker and maker of fine furniture Peter
Korn admits, “I simply inhabited my passion” (2013, p. 28). Nordin, again, attests that
she knew that clay was her medium the first time she encountered it. Describing herself
as its “ally and companion”, she emphasizes that “[T]he ability of this shapeless
material to answer the call of my hands fascinated me” (personal webpage).
Studio jeweller and writer Bruce Metcalf (2000) explains the intensity and immedi-
acy of the experience of connectedness with materials while working them by a certain
genetically determined bodily-kinaesthetic intelligence (Gardner 1985). This intelli-
gence involves “the ability to use one’s body in highly differentiated and skilled ways,
for expressive as well as goal-directed purposes” and “the capacity to work skillfully
with objects, both those that involve the fine motor movements of one’s fingers and
hands and those that exploit gross motor movements of the body” (Gardner 1985, p.
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206). Metcalf maintains that working with your hands feels very comfortable when it
conforms to a pre-existing complex of latent abilities, and that the emotionally charged
experience of discovering this intelligence in oneself has the power to change a
person’s life.
The second type of experience with clay consists in the feeling of being in contact
with the physical or ‘real’ world, typifying the relation between human beings and their
environment phenomenologically and metaphysically. Natasha Daintry (2007, p. 12),
artist working with porcelain and former Japanese scholar, contends that
…attending to the physicality of things has the effect of locating you in the world
and connecting you to your own physicality. It represents a way of felt experi-
ence, of being known and knowing the world through the corporeal.
According to a practice-led ethnographic study of studio potters’ relations to the earth
through their experiences of working with clay, potters experience a feeling of intimacy
with the material world in virtue of physically connecting to it through the clay (Benoît
2013). This connection presents itself as somehow out of the ordinary — as inter-
corporeal, between bodies, putting the self in a strangely organic dialogue with
materials and things. Working with clay can make the potter’s sensory and bodily
relation to the physical world intensely manifest to him or her.
The feeling of strong affinity between working with clay and engaging with life
recurs in the literature on pottery. Potters’ personal statements evidence that having
experiences with clay depends on not merely a history of experiences of (working with)
clay, but a history of experiencing with clay characterized by a deep and intimate
emotional engagement of personal significance. The central place that the personal
involvement with clay has in the life of many potters, disregarding level of skill,
suggests that there is something about the embodied experience of making pottery that
calls forth an archetypical, primordial manner of being-in-the-world, of being there tout
court, in the guise of a being-with-the-world, or rather, with-the-clay.
The third type of experience with clay will provide the starting-point for our inquiry
into the potters’ experience of dialogue while throwing and typically is expressed by
skilled potters. It consists in the experience that the clay is communicating with you
while you are working it. This experience is continuous with the unfolding process of
shaping the clay. Crucially, the potter is experiencing with the clay, in the words of
Falin (2014, p. 2) opening up “an intrinsic connection to ceramic material that is
constantly influencing my engagement to it.”
Master potters regularly describe making in terms that reveal an emotional under-
standing of the process, and tend to perceive making as intrinsically meaningful. The
experience of a dialogic rather than dominating relation between themselves and the
clay underwrites their practical understanding of making. The following statement of
potter and teacher Susan Claysmith (personal webpage) serves to exemplify this:
I developed an interest in playing in the mud as a child and in my early teens
discovered that working with clay was intensely more satisfying. Clay is a
superbly malleable medium for creativity; its inherent nature inspires an interac-
tive dialogue which can guide the direction of the work. I begin with a general
concept and as I become involved in the making, this dialogue takes the lead.
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Japanese potter Ken Matsuzaki describes a similar dialogic relation with the clay in an
interview for the exhibition of his work at the Goldmark gallery (2018):
Actually, I don’t feel or think anything before I create something. I just look at the
clay, its condition, and then touch it and start throwing. I hear the voice of the
clay, where it wants to go, what shape it would like to be. That’s how I make
things.
Whereas Susan Claysmith uses the combined techniques of hand building and wheel-
work many potters have noticed the presence of a dialogic relation with the clay on the
wheel in order to centre and shape it. Centring the clay means that its mass and its outer
edges are aligned and spin perfectly smooth without bumps or wobbles. It constitutes
the first step in the throwing process, and begins with placing the clay on the wheel. As
the wheel turns, the potter puts his or her cupped hands around the clay and then, using
both arms and hands, centred firmly with his or her body, applies pressure to the
spinning clay till it becomes a unified mass that can be pressed down or pulled up to a
conical shape.
In the next step, the clay is pushed downward from the top, into a flattened
half-sphere, then coned up and down a few times in order to homogenise the
material. To open the centred mound of clay and create the beginning of the
interior of the vessel, fingers or thumbs are slowly pushed down into the centre
of the clay mound, leaving a sufficient amount of clay for the bottom. The
resulting walls are then pulled apart, leaving a base that is then compressed
with lateral sweeping of the fingers to prevent later cracking, and the walls then
raised and carefully thinned. Thereafter, any shape can be formed. Throwing is
a delicate procedure and developing expertise usually requires decades of
training.
Alluding to the Asian habit of meditating before throwing, educator and potter
Kenneth Beittel asserts: “[d]ynamic centering is never accomplished through sheer will
and force. If we are off center, we virtually feel lopsided and eccentric; we cannot work
unless the clay, in finding its center, centers us” (2017, p. 16). Potter, poet, and writer
Mary Caroline Richards repeatedly inquired into the dialogical character of centring. In
an oft-quoted passage she describes how centring brings the clay into an un-wobbling
pivot, free to take innumerable shapes as potter and clay firmly and tenderly press
against each other, “like a handclasp between two living hands”. She concludes that
“[I]t is this speech between the hand and the clay that makes me think of dialogue”
(Richards 1989, p. 9).
Finally, conducting practice-based research about the meaning of making, Australian
writer and ceramicist Sophia Alice Phillips (2010, p.66) describes working in ceramics
as a tactile conversation:
As skill develops, centering becomes a kind of reverent physical and mental ritual
that introduces the hand to clay and the maker to the making process. (—)
Centering is a tactile process, a conversation of sensation and response; so much
so, it can be done with a minimum of visual scrutiny. With head down, eyes
closed, and senses focussed on the wet sliding sensation, the potter taps into a
central force.
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Not surprisingly, the experience of one’s own relation with clay varies in intensity and
character over time depending on the length of the potter’s relationship with the clay
and his or her current conditions of life and type of work. The novice’s relationship
with the clay often takes the form of an infatuation with turbulent and volatile mood
swings. With a few years of training and technical proficiency, feelings of respect and
care but also confidence and recognition have gained in prominence and dominate, and
in principle admit of maintaining the balanced dialogic relation to which master potters
refer. Furthermore, the sociocultural context influences experience. Large-scale pro-
duction work often is mechanical and monotonic, containing little by way of dialogue,
while studio pottery allows for variation and creativity and sometimes invites a playful
approach to the clay (cf. Soemantri 2000, p. 79).
In spite of the varying conditions for pottery making, the dialogic conception of
hand building and throwing has made its way into handbooks and consequently may be
considered part of the received view. To exemplify, the illustrated instructions for
shaping clay in The potter’s studio handbook: A start-to-finish guide to hand-built
and wheel-thrown ceramics by the experienced potter and educator Kristin Muller, state
that “Shaping requires a dialogue between the inner and outer hands” and “Fingers
create a dialog with clay” (Müller 2007, p.86). The accompanying photographs show
close-ups of hands grasping and working clay.
Let us conclude the discussion of the third type of experience with clay. The
quotations suggest that, in addition to being emotionally imbued, the dialogue with
clay that master potters experience themselves as having is characterized by reciprocity
and balance. It involves openness to the other (clay) as illustrated by the potters’ letting
the clay show the way. Within this experience, clay and potter apparently contribute to
the process of making on similar terms, in that the potter listens to and responds to the
clay while taking care not to impose his or her own ideas or preconceptions. Some
potters explicitly express a preference for the kind of making that drives or perpetuates
itself, rather than for taking the lead. They let the on-going process take the upper hand,
an attitude that reveals trust in the material and themselves as well as in the unfolding
practise. Their attitude is one of curiosity and openness to surprise, much like in a
dialogue between two or more autonomous individuals of equal standing (Brinck and
Balkenius 2018; Honneth 1995).
To repeat, our interest does not so much lie in the veracity of the potters’
experiences as in their nature. The task we set ourselves is twofold (assuming
that essentially the conclusions transfer to other types of crafts). It is, first, to
explain the emergence and nature of the potters’ experience of a dialogic
relation with the clay; second, to roughly determine the consequences of having
this experience for the process of making.
We will begin by examining three, prima facie reasonable, accounts of the relation
between maker and material to determine what each has to say about its dialogic
aspects. Although sometimes considered rivals, we expect these accounts to provide
complementary perspectives. In section 4, we will consider Merleau-Ponty’s (1945)
phenomenology of the perception of the material world, describing the potter’s relation
with the clay as of habit and routine. We then turn to the link between individual motor
skill and sociocultural practice as described within the skilled intentionality framework
(Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014). In section 5, we consider the relation between potter
and clay within the framework of cognitive archaeology and Material Engagement
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Theory (Malafouris 2013) that conceive of the potter’s involvement with clay as
mediated by material culture, e.g., artefacts and techniques. In section 6, we
return to the nature of the potters’ experience of having a dialogue with clay
and develop the view that this experience springs from being emotionally
involved with clay.
4 Habitual or motor engagement
According to Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1945, pp. 167ff) we encounter the material
world through motor behaviour. Understanding is a function of motor ability, realised
in the body as agent (the “I can”, p. 160) that is reaching for something, and consists in
the agreement of intention and effectuation, prediction and control. It derives from
habit, a knowledge (savoir) that exists in the hands and only is for bodily use, and that
cannot be translated into an objective description. Habit is tacit, which means the agent
can recognize its impact or effect but is unable to specify how the impact was achieved
(Polanyi 1966): it reflects that we can know more than we can tell.
Habits and routines reside in the body and develop by motor incorporation, a process
that establishes a new manner of moving through and relating to the world by
reorganizing the agent’s personal body space. The sum of an individual’s habits
constitutes his or her body space. Motor incorporation requires learning to use new
artefacts – in the case of throwing, most obviously the wheel. Within the pattern of a
habit, behaviour and artefact become interdependent: The existence of the one depends
on the existence of the other because of the entwinement of behaviour function and
artefact function. Thus, learning how to write on the computer entails integrating the
keyboard into body space; similarly, developing the skills for throwing entails integra-
tion of the wheel. Merleau-Ponty (ibid., p. 170) refers to the organist: “Playing an
instrument, the player does not position his hands (or feet on the pedals of the organ) in
objective space, but in the space of his or her own body.” He asserts that the player sits
down by the organ and settles into it like into his own house, the instrument appropri-
ated by the player.
Another of Merleau-Ponty’s (ibid. p. 167) examples reveals that learning a skill
amounts to motor incorporation in quite a literal sense: The blind man’s stick is
transformed and becomes part of his sensory field, much like gaze. It is not an object
for the agent, not an intermediary but augments the reach of touch: The blind man feels
the objects at the end of the stick, not the stick. The cane can extend the reach of the
blind man because it has become part of his body and like his other body parts is
experientially transparent to him (Krueger 2019).
Throwing certainly involves bodily skill or habit in Merleau-Ponty’s sense, the
wheel acquiring a similar function to the potter as the cane to the blind man – a means
for interaction with the world instead of being a participant in it. Feeling at home with
the equipment implies that you trust it to perform as expected and that you rely on it,
both feelings being vital for the proper functioning of motor behaviour. Attending to the
wheel instead of the clay would be detrimental to throwing; the wheel must work
seamlessly not to interrupt the process. Hence, motor incorporation explains how both
wheel and clay can be made to effortlessly disappear from the potter’s perceptual field
by integration into his or her body space.
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Based in sensorimotor contingencies that connect sensation and perception to
movement and action, habit operates independently of conscious awareness.2 It lies
at the bottom of intentional behaviour, forging the link between meaningful appear-
ances that function as invitations to act and motor behaviour that functions as re-
sponses. Responses that issue from habit are guaranteed to maintain the equilibrium
between body and world and in that sense can be considered optimal. They will cohere
with the agent’s idiosyncratic map of the environment, i.e., his or her body space.
Integrating (somato)sensory and motor signals, habit is designed to maintain the flow
of action while working the clay without demanding the potter’s personal involvement
or drawing his or her attention to specificities. Accordingly, as long as the external
conditions stay about the same, habit results in fail-safe, effortless, and fluent interac-
tion with the material world that does not demand monitoring or supervision. The
throwing as it were runs itself. Deviations are sensed as a tension or lack of fluency or
correspondence and are corrected on the fly by moving towards improving synchroni-
sation and re-establishing the rhythm of the activity.
It might be considered a drawback of the theory that it does not distinguish between
expert and everyday skill. There seems to be something that experts know that the
layperson does not by way of a qualitative and not mere quantitative difference, and
that characterizes the way experts interact with the environment in tasks that call for
their particular kind of expertise. On the other hand, very likely any significant
difference in skilful behaviour between expert and layman or novice concerns other
dimensions of the maker’s engagement with the material than sensorimotor contingen-
cy or affordance-based responsiveness (as argued towards the end of the paper).
One weakness concerns the absence of a link between individual motor skill and
social practice. The sensorimotor contingencies that result in motor incorporation
originate in the agent-artefact dyad, yet artefact function tends to be embedded in
normative shared practices and motivated by belonging to a network of related
artefacts, materials, events, rituals, roles, and attitudes (Costall 2012). In practice,
involvement with the material world cannot be separated from involvement with the
social and cultural world; behaviour makes sense to us when its purpose arises from
within pragmatically contextualized social projects (Gallagher and Marcel 1999; Brinck
2015). Responding to the solicitations of materials and things as cues to get something
done irrespective of their larger social and pragmatic context does not permit accessing
the web of pragmatic and social meanings that motivate their function.
Integrating Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology into the context of ecological psychol-
ogy, Erik Rietveld (2008, p. 993) conceives of skill in terms of affective directed
responses to affordances: relational properties of materials or things that present
artefacts by what we can do with them (Gibson 1979). An agent’s effectivities are
complementary to the perceived affordances and constitute the set of responses she
actually can produce. To the craftsperson, whose body has been attuned to the
2 Sensorimotor theory (seeO’Regan andNoë 2001; Degenaar andO’Regan 2015) in several respects resembles
Merleau-Ponty’s theory. Rejecting the notion of internal representation, it claims that perceptual consciousness
is constituted by the exercise of implicit capacities for being attuned to aspects of the environment, which
depend on mastery of sensorimotor dependencies linking possible actions and resulting changes in sensory
stimulation. Perception is enacted: it unfolds behaviourally in dynamic engagement with the environment, e.g.
the capacity to see the colour of an object is displayed by grasping the coloured object or naming its colour. The
quality of conscious experience likewise consists in patterns of sensorimotor engagement.
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environment by practice, the relevant tools and materials will directly present them-
selves as meaningful. Emphasizing the unreflective and pre-reflective dimensions of
making, Rietveld carefully places the body and not the person at the centre of his
account, arguing that the attuned body does not deliberate but allows itself to be invited
to act by the environment. The natural tendency towards equilibrium, or stability and
harmony, eliminates the need for deliberation. In the flow of action the body’s skills are
immediately potentiated by the meaningful objects that surround it, “responding to the
piece of leather as that which is ‘to be cut up’” (2008, p. 992).
Introducing norms and emotions into the ecological framework permits specifying
how the environment fosters expert skill, and grounds artefact function in social
practice and tradition (Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014). Shared practices embody tacit
normative concerns for the adequacy of artefacts that structure the motor potentialities
of the body (Rietveld 2008). This enables feelings or lived experiences of directed
discontent (a reaction of appreciation in action) that prompt selective corrective re-
sponses, and permits getting things right without reflection. The appropriate responses
are drawn out of the body without the agent’s awareness: The craftsperson simply
allows himself or herself to be moved to improve until the experience of discontent has
ceased.
By embedding motor behaviour in social practice, the skilled intentionality frame-
work can compensate for the weakness mentioned above. It shifts the emphasis from
habit and sensorimotor contingencies to socio-material affordance responses, behaviour
being determined by attunement to the shared environment instead of relative to the
agent’s body space. This brings tradition and sociocultural influence into the picture.
Importantly, relating throwing to the social context locates it along another temporal
scale than the analysis in terms of habit. The latter relates to individual behaviour down
to the micro level and permits approaching throwing in terms of the combination of
gross and fine motor skills that ultimately enable it. This means that in the end, the
skilled intentionality framework does not function to replace Merleau-Ponty’s theory of
motor incorporation, but the two theories represent different takes on skilful behaviour.
To conclude, unattended and pre-reflective habit ensures recognition and function-
ality and supports fast and fluent motor behaviour. By reducing surprise and increasing
predictability, habit can provide the baseline for exploration. It sustains a harmonious
field of action where the agent feels safe and can trust tools and materials to behave as
expected, and thereby prepares for the kind of open-ended and active involvement with
the material world that experts sometimes show, and that we argue underlies the
experience of the dialogic relation. To the maker, the value of habitual engagement
for making lies, it seems, in boosting the experience of trust and confidence by taking
care of the routine part of skilful behaviour. Interestingly, this modulation of certain of
the maker’s emotions may have greater significance for making than does speeding up
or facilitating the underlying processing, as illustrated by master potters’ placid attitude
to throwing.
Expert potters throw slowly and carefully also when they are working fast. Their
entire emotional state is one of complete trust in the behaviour of the clay. Even when
things go wrong, the experienced potter does not see it as a reason to panic, but just
recognizes the error and corrects it. An emotional atmosphere of faith and calm
surrounds the process of throwing. Whatever happens, it will not appear out of the
ordinary but materializes within the dialogue the potter is having with the clay. Taking
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the clay by the hand and going for a walk is not a fearsome prospect but an ordinary
one, because you know the clay will be there with you. In contrast, getting anxious, or
rushing it, or trying to make it match a certain standard, thus getting ahead of yourself,
all signal the lack of trust or even distrust in the clay and self that is typical of the
novice. Trust in the material and one’s own abilities seem inextricably entwined.
5 Material engagement
Lambros Malafouris has investigated making at length from the potter’s perspective
within the framework of Material Engagement Theory (MET) (Malafouris, e.g. 2008,
2011, 2013, 2014, 2019). According to MET, materiality mediates cognition and
significantly contributes to human cognitive skills on different time-scales, both in
the historical and individual perspective. The notion of material engagement was
developed by Colin Renfrew (e.g. 2001), in arguing that materials play a scaffolding
role in the historical development of human cognition. Increasing material engagement
results in new ways of organizing actions and groups with new concepts developing
that reflect the changes, and interaction with these concepts generates feedback-loops
that cause re-organisation of the actions and groups, et cetera. The invention of the
potter’s wheel provides an example of how artefacts can transform cognition, creating
new forms of systemic units and activities.
MET traces the cognitive history of the human species by disclosing the mind’s
reliance on the continually evolving material environment. Fundamentally MET is a
theory about the nature of mind and cognition that aims to show that mind and matter
are one by investigating the mind’s interdependence with things and our variable ways
of dealing with them. It builds on three hypotheses about the extended mind (the mind
constitutively depends on materials and processes outside of the brain/body), the
enactive sign (material signs are constitutive of sense-making), and material agency
(agency emerges from the interaction between agents and the material world). The
overall thrust of MET and its theoretical framework is consistent with the outlook
defended here (one of us has developed a similar framework within cognitive
aesthetics, see Brinck 2007). Our present aim concerns determining how MET can
contribute to explain the particular dialogic nature of making experienced by
proficient potters (cf. sect. 2).
A cognitive archaeologist, Malafouris uses material remains to understand the
development of human cognitive practises. In a series of insightful studies, he has
examined how materiality modulates cognition in throwing. Malafouris (2008) rejects
the notion of internal representation and claims that agency and intentionality are
distributed and emergent, brought forth by the ‘mediational potential’ of artefacts and
techniques that educate the senses and constrain behaviour. He articulates the relation
between maker and material within the framework of dynamic systems theory and
pictures their respective contribution to the process as near-equal, describing how the
shaping of a vessel results from the collaboration between hand and clay, which are in
constant contact throughout the process with the clay spinning on the wheel without
interruption. The potter engages directly with the material environment without inter-
mediaries. Entrainment, the universal tendency of physical systems to automatically
coordinate to spatially or temporally structured autonomous events and rhythmic
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movements (Clayton et al. 2005), assimilates potter and clay by synchronization,
causing patterned behaviour to arise that functions to stabilize the interaction.
Malafouris (2014, p. 350) explains that
…the potter’s perception–action loops and movements are dynamically coupled
and resonate with the affordances and physical qualities of the material at hand, as
if maker and material, potter and clay, can participate in each other’s sense
making.
Thus, the creative process develops with the spontaneous coordination of potter with
clay with the wheel acting as an enabling constraint (Malafouris 2014). The pot is
enacted, a product of “the potter’s movement and skilful active material engagement”
(Malafouris 2011, p. 136). The potter’s intentions-in-action dominate the progress of
the process (Malafouris 2014, p. 151): Being sensitive to and following the material at
hand involves providing directed responses to its affordances, and in the absence of
explicit intentions to act ahead, the process both literally and figuratively will be in the
hands of the human agent.
Malafouris (2014, p. 151) points to a felt material consciousness, the “heterogeneous
mix of phenomenal qualities and resources (specificity, awareness, commitment, atten-
tiveness and creative memory)” that potters take as a given. This ‘feeling of and for
clay’ is realised through the negotiations and improvisations between fingers and clay,
and rarely surfaces the threshold of conscious awareness. The physical resources of
clay, wheel, water or instrument are not used by the body on command from the brain,
but are integrated into the agent’s movement and functioning (Malafouris 2008, p. 32)
in a process that has its own inner logic and momentum. Sometimes material con-
sciousness takes the form of flow, “an almost automatic, effortless, yet highly focused
state of consciousness” (Csikszentmihalyi 1996, p. 110). Hence the feeling of and for
clay involves experiences and phases of absorption and submission to the material as
well as active exploration (Malafouris and Koukouti (2017, p. 297). Resigning from the
power of control, the potter intermittently is aware of attending to what happens.
Elucidating the interaction dynamics of throwing requires determining the place of
the wheel and other tools in the process. Malafouris approaches this issue as a problem
about the origin of agency, repudiating the traditional ontological distinction between
mind and matter that accords agency to the mind only, and describes throwing as
follows (2008, p. 34):
The shaping of the pot becomes an act of collaboration between the potter and the
mass of wet clay rapidly spinning upon the wheel. There is a constant tactile but
also clearly visible, dynamic tension in the movement of clay. On the one hand,
the centrifugal force imparted to the clay by the movement of the wheel and the
hands of the potter; and on the other, the skilful guidance of this force by the
potter’s fingers, raising or pressing down the clay to the desired form. The skin
and nerve endings of the potter’s palms and fingers as it were delineates the
boundary between human agent and material thing. The clay is inert in itself but
acquires force via the wheel that the potter controls, and the form and shape of the
vessel gradually emerges in the interactive tension between the centrifugal force
and the texture of the wet clay.
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The quotation pictures potter and clay as the main parties in the act, and states that the
clay is inert and acquires its force from the wheel in turn controlled by the potter,
seemingly framing the potter as in charge. However, Malafouris shows that the agency
problem does not have a simple answer, because the pot is both hand-made and wheel-
made: The operation of the hand that shapes the clay is constrained by the wheel.
Granted that agency is the relational and emergent product of material engagement, the
wheel alternatingly define the activity or function as a means for the potter’s purposes.
Javanese craft and art historian and ceramic artist Hilda Soemantri discusses the role
of the wheel in a study of modern Indonesian ceramics, based in interviews with three
groups of ‘clay artists’, one group working only with pottery (‘potters’). Her study
corroborates the insight that the wheel plays a substantial part in throwing, but
functions as an extension of the clay artist in the process. She remarks that “[T]he
rotation of the wheel gathers up feelings and energy and transforms the clay in unison
with the artist, creating in the end work that bears the strong influence of the wheel”
(Soemantri 2000, p. 77). Artists who work with pottery-based ceramics express an
understanding of their relation to the clay as submissive, and let the material guide the
process while identifying with it and their working tool. They incorporate the wheel
into their body space, as predicted by the theory of habitual engagement. In contrast,
ceramic artists who work from sculpture, using hand-techniques while rejecting the
wheel, feel free to move in any direction and use the clay as they desire (ibid. p. 78).
They experience themselves as materially unconstrained. A last group of clay artists
who apply ceramics to installation work do not have any specific feelings for clay,
ceramics being a steppingstone to the goal of spatial exploration.
Returning to the first group, the Indonesian potters’ relations to wheel and clay are
distinct and correspond to the separate roles they assign to the wheel and clay – to the
wheel the means that simultaneously organizes the activity and restricts the freedom of
the potter, to the clay a partner in close collaboration. While in constant interaction
during the entire process, hand, clay and wheel play distinct roles for engagement, the
wheel restraining the interaction between potter and clay, the clay behaving as an
autonomous force open to engagement. Furthermore, Soemantri (2000, p.78) notes a
strong identification with the clay, independent of using the wheel, among makers who
take a conceptual, artistic attitude toward ceramics and remarks that in them “the
intimacy between artist and material is at its highest. The artist and the clay are one”.
Soemantri’s observations reveal a difference in how makers relate to on the one hand
the material and on the other the tools used for working it, depending on their line of
work. Her study suggests that the material alone can be a partner in dialogue, the potters
perceiving themselves as sharing agentive properties with it. While the wheel has
causal force, it functions as a go-between that constrains the potter’s dialogue with
clay. It becomes part of habit and functions as a mediator of the world (cf. section 4).
Because the theory of habitual engagement conceives of the world from the agent’s
perspective as a target for instrumental action, it cannot do justice to the potters’
experience of the clay as a partner. To an agent operating only in the mode of motor
habit it would not really make sense to treat the clay otherwise than as a means for
getting something done. This matter would present a problem for explaining the
potter’s engagement with the wheel in terms of motor incorporation (with Merleau-
Ponty) and with the clay in terms of dynamic coupling (with Malafouris), if habitual
and material engagement were incompatible or rival accounts. However, we argue that
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habitual and material engagement involve the maker with the material world in distinct
but complementary ways. Occurring on different time-scales and levels of complexity,
the one relies on routine, the other on dynamic coupling, and together they support
pragmatically contextualized and socioculturally shaped behaviour.
In some respects, coupling resembles the dialogic relation experienced by skilled
potters, e.g., both entail a tight interaction between the systems. Nevertheless, we think
there are significant differences between dynamic coupling and the master potters’
notion of dialogue. While participatory interaction may cause the perception of an
agentive and animate quality of clay (Malafouris 2014) or the lived experience of
making (Gosden and Malafouris 2015), coupling basically is an implicit process
grounded in sensorimotor synchronization and operating independently of conscious
awareness. Describing throwing, Malafouris (2014, p. 143) refers to “the constructive
dialogue between maker and matter”, relating it to “the capacity to affect and be
affected through movement and sensation from the phenomenal qualities of the
materials that surrounds us”. This capacity certainly is pivotal for making. In our view,
the quotes from ceramists refer to another equally important process that is inherently
emotional and unfolds on the personal level of felt qualities.
As such, the term interaction does not carry with it any requirement for emotional
involvement. One can interact – with a machine, or with a person – without necessarily
much emotion involved. Buying a train ticket, one can get away with the minimal
interaction required – stating your destination, putting out the money, waiting and then
receiving the ticket, absent-mindedly saying thank you, perhaps even without looking
towards the seller. Interaction must contain something more: a smile, a joke, gratitude,
surprise, dislike, attraction, pleasure, interest, for us to say that we are engaged.
The potter coupling to the clay, the two temporarily forming a single system, brings
about entrainment of bodily orientation, movement, direction, et cetera, that organizes
and stabilises the interaction. Dynamic coupling does not result in dialogue in the
master potters’ sense of the word, but because it progressively increases over-all
coherence and reduces uncertainty, it prepares for the spontaneous emergence of
open-ended and playful episodes of personal engagement that typically are experienced
as dialogic.
6 Emotional engagement
In the quotes from ceramists, there is a common and frequent reference to the need for
dialogue with the clay. The quotes also show that there is a rich atmosphere of emotion
running through their work, while emotion does not have any specific role to play in
Merleau-Ponty’s theory of habit or Malafouris’ material engagement theory. In line
with these findings, we maintain that the maker’s experience of having a dialogue with
his or her chosen material arises within deep emotional engagement with the material.
Emotional involvement permits approaching the clay nonverbally yet attentively and
caringly. In our view, emotion engages the agent with the world in a way that functions
to complement habitual and material forms of engagement.
That engagement with the world is emotional means that the agent is emotionally
involved with it, as compared to material engagement where the agent is involved via
artefacts and habitual engagement where the agent is involved by way of motor skill.
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These distinctions are theoretical, not absolute: Habitual, material, and emotional
engagements tend to occur simultaneously, to overlap and influence each other. While
functionally distinct, all forms of engagement act to sustain interaction with the
environment and restore it when it fails. Emotional engagement concerns the agent
as a whole (body and person in one) and the ‘other’ as present to the agent. It involves
cognitive and motivational aspects and unfolds simultaneously on several distinct yet
interconnected temporal scales, and in the interpersonal context is intersubjectively
experienced.
Emotions rarely constitute discrete sequential states (Krueger 2019). Even though
the term ‘emotion’ often is used in the singular to refer to categorical affects, it
is more correct to refer to a plurality, simultaneously incorporating multiple
emotional continua, where competing feelings can actively co-exist. Emotion is
necessarily multi-dimensional, multi-scalar, and multimodal, taking on a variety
of functional roles (Ratcliffe 2009; Stern 2004). In agreement with phenome-
nology that sees affect as connecting body, self, and world (Fuchs 2013), we
conceive of emotions relationally, in the case of making as arising from the
interplay between agent and material (Brinck 2018b) and infusing the experi-
ences of self and other with valence.
We submit that, first, the potters’ emotional engagement with clay shares certain
properties with interpersonal emotional engagement that are constitutive of dialogue in
human communication, and, second, these properties support the potters’ experience of
having a dialogue with clay. Furthermore, we submit that in the context of
making, emotional engagement affords a distinctive qualitative enhancement of
the interaction between potter and clay that typically occurs with experienced
and master artisans (to be specified below). Emotion does not merely alert the
maker to deviations from the predicted course of events in view of maintaining
equilibrium as suggested by the frameworks discussed so far, but it can serve
as a guide to qualitative change that circumvents the balance (Brinck 2018a).
Emotional engagement is a transformative process that changes the participants’
attitudes towards the world and themselves.
To account for the dialogic core of emotional engagement, we turn to developmental
psychology. In our view, early emotional engagement between infant and caregiver
constitutes the primordial dialogic relation: This is where the link between emotional
engagement and dialogue is forged and the constitutive conditions for dialogue (verbal
or nonverbal) begin to materialize. One way of looking at dialogic engagement
is structurally, as dependent on the capacities and level of skill of the individual
participants and various turn-taking patterns. Another way is functionally, from
the perspective of the emotional relation between interacting agents (Reddy 2008)
thus avoiding prima facie concessions about which agents or entities are capable of
dialogue. Our present concern will be with the functional properties of dialogic
engagement.
The literature on early infant development is rich in references to emotionality and
dialogic engagement. Infants express emotions from birth, and show emotional expres-
sions even in utero as seen using 3D ultra sound scans in response to external
stimulation (Marx and Nagy 2015; Reissland et al. 2011; Zoia et al. 2007, 2013).
The dialogic characteristics of emotional engagement emerge by 2-months of age in
face-to-face interaction, and consist in the spontaneous, continuous, and dynamic
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exchange of vocal, facial, and bodily expressions of emotion, and soon it includes the
reciprocal coordination and sequencing of behaviour in time (Markova and Legerstee
2006; Trevarthen 1979). Humans, like many animals, move with rhythmic gestures that
express motive states and changes of emotion and mood (Trevarthen 2008). Perturba-
tions of interaction as in temporal lags and still-face, when the adult freezes her
behaviour in the middle of the interaction, can leave infants distressed and disengaged
or making bids to regain what looks like attention lost (Tronick et al. 1978).
Vasudevi Reddy has argued that the infant needs dialogue to develop with and
understand the world (Reddy 2008, in press; Reddy and Uithol 2015). Second-person
or I-Thou engagements open up new ways of being and new possibilities for under-
standing and create new things to be aware of. Two key features of dialogic engage-
ment are openness and recognition (Reddy 2008, 2018, in press). Openness entails
interest in others and the ability to act with them. Infants show intense interest in the
other and respond very clearly to being addressed even at birth. In videos of neonatal
imitation the presence of the dialogic relation is evident in the infant’s responses to the
other’s modelling of facial gestures to the infant (Kugiumutzakis 1998¸ Meltzoff and
Moore 1977). Recognition involves confirming the other as individual and partner in
the dialogue by responding to his or her address in an honest and concerned manner.
The embodied experience of being addressed in the second person constitutes a
recognition by the other of the infant’s presence and subjectivity, and the critical spur
for infants’ entry into the shared world (Reddy 2003, 2008, 2011, 2018; Schilbach et al.
2013). Embodied experience arouses emotional responses differently from watching
someone else be addressed, and engenders – even if briefly – a mutuality and
suspension of separateness. The other becomes an individual to you, someone who
knocks you off balance and enters your consciousness in a more fundamental way than
when you are largely untouched by the other, or is just watching them. Emotional
engagement seeks response, and if the world does not reciprocate actions and expres-
sions in some way, engagement does not happen. The openness to and recognition
within emotional engagement are vital for dialogue and enable acting together, as a
plural subject or We (Brinck et al. 2017).
Focusing on the functional properties of emotional engagement and grounding the
notion of dialogue in emotional engagement lead us to reject the widespread view that
verbal face-face interaction constitutes the paradigm of human communication
(Bavelas et al. 1997). Similar to dialogism (Linell 2009), our approach revolves around
interactivity and responsivity, conceiving of dialogue as the core of language rather
than a mere use or form of language. Per Linell’s (2014, 2018) extended dialogism
abandons the language-centred conception of dialogue and makes the mutual depen-
dencies of self and other in sense-making the fundamental point whether the interaction
is verbal or not, much like the view defended here. On Linell’s approach as on ours,
openness to others and to otherness or alterity is vital for dialogic engagement. That
meaning is construed with others entails that dialogue is inter-relational, not thing-like:
a historical, socio-culturally embedded, sense-making interactivity. Linell argues that
people are invoking language indirectly also when not explicitly using it, drawing on
artefacts the meanings of which are socially constructed. We agree that modern human
forms of life are couched in language and inseparable from their linguistic scaffolding,
but do not take this point to imply that the notion of dialogue is language-dependent. To
us dialogue is primary.
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7 Dialogue in making
Returning to the ceramists’ personal statements, certain persisting aspects stand
out that describe the interaction with clay in terms that normally are kept for
interpersonal engagement, e.g., listening to the clay, acting together with the
clay, the autonomy of the clay, the clay listening and responding to the potter,
the clay having a voice and it taking the lead. We think that similarly to the
case of emotional engagement between infant and adult, the potters’ involve-
ment with clay is characterized by openness and recognition. Granted, there are
disanalogies between the two cases to do with intersubjectivity, most obviously
the fact that potter but not clay is a sentient being. However, on the functional
approach to emotional engagement the participants’ cognitive and mental ca-
pacities are irrelevant for establishing the nature of the interaction: What
matters is the relation between them.
Clay does not literally address or attend to you, but clearly is open to engagement and
responds immediately and variably to movement and touch. Its behaviour is unpredict-
able but not accidental, and addressing it demands attention and care. Clay reacts
directly to maltreatment and crucially, stands in need of openness and recognition for
the experience of dialogue to occur. If the potter does not listen and adjust to the pot on
the wheel or recognise its presence and autonomy, throwing will not attain the progres-
sive and open-ended character typical of dialogue in making. Hence, you need gentle-
ness to be sensitive to what the pot is doing or doing wrong. Trying to get a young child
dressed to go out, you would not rush at her in impatience or abandon the interaction at
the first sign of failure, but you would curb your frustration, your movements gentle and
caring. Likewise, caring for the pot while on the wheel seems to bring out the best in it,
and you need to learn how to respect the other in order to be gentle with it.
The following quotations illustrate that the experienced maker’s dialogic engage-
ment with the material creates an impression of working together as partners. First,
consider American potter and teacher Joy Friedman Colorado’s (personal webpage)
description of throwing:
Clay is so sensitive and responsive in my hands. There’s a dialog between my
intention and the clay’s own ability to be expressive. As the clay responds to my
touch and listens to my directions, it also lets me know about its limits and its many
possibilities. We are co-creators. For me making pots is a process that has structure
and technique, yet there is always space for spontaneity and inspiration to occur.
Referring to the connection between co-creation and divergence, Colorado recognises
that dialogue cannot thrive on convergence alone. A productive dialogue needs friction
and tension that sustain its forward movement (Linell 2009), and in verbal interaction,
divergent behaviour such as selective alignment is frequent (Hodges 2014). In an
extended analysis of his relationship with clay during the creation of a series of clay
sculptures, the artist Paul March (2017) also addresses co-creation:
Sculptural forms seem to arise directly from the interaction between my
body (eyes, arms and hands) and the clay. It feels like the clay and I
create something together.
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And further down:
Whilst sculpting it feels to me that agency and creativity are not personal
attributes but emerge out of the act of sculpting. When I monitor my sense of
agency closely I get a confused, conflicting picture, but the overall sense is one in
which I am in a creative partnership with clay.
These quotations reflect that dialogue is essentially mutual, bringing together
differences that generate something unexpected. Emotion has a central place in
this. It underlies the perception of meaning and provides the content that turns
an encounter into an exchange, driven by curiosity and the negotiation of
feelings and experience.
We suggest that the potters’ experience of a dialogic relation with clay while
throwing emerges from moving with the clay and thereby being moved emotionally
(Hobson 2002, 2008; Reddy 2008). While aware of dynamic movement as a kinetic
flow fused with affect (Sheets-Johnstone 2010), the potter unknowingly relies on the
intimate connection between motion and emotion (Sheets-Johnstone 1999;
Fuchs and Koch 2014) to make sense of the process. Feedback is continuous
and bi-directional and the potter alternatingly is matching, complementing,
counterbalancing, and compensating for changes in the clay. Body feedback
from movements made in response to the clay and the clay’s reactions to the
touch of the hand trigger emotions in the potter that modulate behaviour in real
time and shape the emerging process. To conclude, engaging with the clay in
the second-person brings another type of information to bear on the interaction
that permits experiencing with the material and understanding variations in and
changes to it from inside the process.
We have argued that dialogic engagement begins with emotion and that this is not
only a developmental truth – emotion remains central throughout life.3 The following
record, drawn from the diary notes of one of us, summarizes the strong significance of
emotional engagement for making. During one phase, she was working with a
particular black clay, re-working clay from recently thrown collapses with
disastrous results. One day her teacher saw her reaching for some rescued clay
and exclaimed “Oh use fresh clay – that clay looks a bit tired!” It was a light
bulb moment for her – suddenly realising that she was not the only participant
in the equation. Shifting the focus away from herself made her more sensitive
to the clay, more accepting of the process and less frustrated by herself. She
accepted a role as a partner in the throwing – a partner with the clay – and the
process became a more open and joint, as well as less fraught, activity. That
concept – that clay itself can have modes and states of being, so obvious in
retrospect – almost immediately gave her perceptual access to things that she
ignored earlier. It permitted her instantly to listen to the condition of the clay,
to perceive the texture and feel the resistance as she worked with it, which she
had previously been too self-centred to manage.
3 Following the suggestion of one of the reviewers, we might refer to this particular form of emotional
engagement as “the dialogical core of lived humanness”.
Dialogue in the making: emotional engagement with materials
The record vividly illustrates how the shift to experiencing with clay, feeling and
acting with it, brings about a fundamental qualitative change to making. This change
underlies the experience of having a dialogue with the clay. Several of the issues that
we have discussed in elucidation of this experience are brought together in the record:
the importance of letting go, openness to otherness, second-person stance, perceiving
the clay as a partner, attending to emotion, and the importance of recognition and
listening to the clay. To summarise, dialogue pivots around the second person, placing
the other at the centre of attention and interest instead of the self.
As in the interpersonal context, I-Thou engagement with materials opens up new
ways of being and understanding and generates new ideas. In our view, dialogue is not
restricted to interaction with other persons but constitutes the primary means for
making sense of and reaching out into the world at large, animate and inanimate.
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